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A land-use law course carries a title that explicitly invites appli-
cation of economic theory. The title identifies a scarce resource
-land-and asserts that the principal question to be studied is
how that resource is to be allocated. Because the allocation of
scarce resources is the core concern of economics, it is hardly
surprising that land-use scholars are increasingly turning to the
Dismal Science. Of course, disciplines other than economics might
also prove to be powerful lenses for revealing what is at stake in
land-use controversies. Urban planning, for example, is an en-
deavor that focuses primarily on this precise subject matter.
However, planning theory has had little impact on legal scholars
because it often invokes concepts which don't seem operational
(e.g., "orderly, balanced growth"), and because planners, unlike
economists, have yet to agree on vocabularies and analytic engines
for attacking the puzzles they confront.
The explicit introduction of economics into a law school class-
room poses two basic problems. First, there is what might be called
the problem of instructional ethics. One cannot be absolutely
confident that instruction in the economic perspective on land-use
problems is worth class time that might otherwise be devoted to
additional substantive topics or on other perspectives on the basic
material. An even more serious ethical issue is that the economist's
lens may so distort reality that it impairs understanding by seducing
students to adopt oversimplified views of the world and to being
attracted by unreliable policy prescriptions. This risk is particu-
larly acute if the instructor ignores other interdisciplinary per-
spectives on land-use issues.
Second, even if one assumes that treatment of the economic
perspective is ethically justified, there remains the basic problem
of implementation. Students arrive at law and planning schools
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with highly varied educational backgrounds. Many have had no
formal training in economics, perhaps because they are put off,
even paralyzed, by graphs and equations. Some students who have
been schooled in economics ultimately reject it at a deep emotional
level because they perceive economists as adopting overly pessi-
mistic assumptions about human behavior.
To illustrate how these ethical and practical problems might
arise in a land-use course, this paper will focus on two concrete
topics. The first is landowner remedies against excessive develop-
ment charges; use of economic analysis should be relatively uncon-
troversial in this context because the courts themselves often pose
some of these legal issues in economic terms. The second example
involves more controversial economics-my own positive theory
about why local governments might choose to sell the right to
develop, and my normative conclusions on the appropriate legal
rules to limit that practice. After exploring these two examples,
the paper will conclude with some thoughts on the unease many
legal scholars currently feel about the law-and-economics enterprise.
I.
UNCONTROVERSIAL ECONOMICS: THE PROBLEM OF REMEDIES
AGAINST EXCESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CHARGES
Local governments often exact land, land improvements, and
sums of money from developers in return for granting subdivision
approvals, rezonings, or other development permissions. In most
states there are vague legal ceilings on such local government
charges. Suppose, by whatever legal test is in effect, that a local
government has gone too far and should be ordered to refund part
of what it has exacted. What can economic analysis reveal about
the appropriate size of the refund and the identity of the party
to whom it should be awarded?
The distinction between compensatory and deterrence goals
(one familiar in the tort literature long before the recent ascen-
dance of law and economics) can help determine the appropriate
amount to be refunded. If compensation were the sole goal to be
pursued, the local government should only be required to give
back the excess it took. By contrast, if one important judicial
purpose in ordering a refund is to deter local governments from
imposing excessive charges in the future, some form of punitive
damages should be added as a "kicker." The economic rationale
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for adding a kicker can be traced to Bentham.' If monetary penal-
ties are to be the sole deterrent against thefts, and some thieves
will not be caught, the monetary penalty must be increased to
account for the improbability of apprehension. Because many
developers can be expected to be chary of suing municipalities
with which they have ongoing dealings, Bentham's analysis sup-
ports giving kickers to developers who do litigate successfully.
In the United States, however, courts have typically limited a
city's liability to the excessive amounts it collected. This is con-
sistent with the general rule that litigants cannot recover punitive
damages from local governments. To defend this result one would
have to believe that deterrence is not an important goal in this
context, perhaps because governments arguably would not respond
to monetary incentives as would private parties. In any event,
evidence from Illinois and New Jersey indicates that the current
remedy (a refund without a kicker) does not deter local govern-
ments from adopting illegal exaction policies. I Economics provides
a vehicle for explaining this phenomenon and also arms develop-
ers' lawyers with potent arguments to support the award of kickers
to their clients.
Now to the second legal issue: Who should be entitled to share
in the refund, whatever its size? In Colonial Oaks West, Inc. v.
Township of East Brunswick,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey
decided that when an overcharged homebuilder is awarded a
refund, he should be entitled to keep only that portion that he did
not pass on to those who purchased houses from him, and that
the portion that he did pass on should be placed in trust to await
claims by house purchasers. In its opinion, that court regarded
it as "likely" that developers completely pass on excessive charges
to their consumers.
Two aspects of the Colonial Oaks opinion warrant discussion.
First, did the court correctly predict the incidence of development
charges that municipalities impose on subdividers? Are such
charges borne by the subdividers themselves or passed forward
1. J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 4 (W. Harrison, ed. 1960).
2. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 903 (1951).
3. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Anal-
ysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 481 n.288 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Suburban Growth
Controls].
4. 61 N.J. 560, 296 A.2d 653 (1972).
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to consumers? Indeed, this statement of the question is improper
because, as the New Jersey Supreme Court failed to recognize,
it is possible that such charges are passed backward to landowners
who sell land to subdividers. (Subdividers might bid less for raw
land if they knew of the high charges they would have to pay sub-
sequently to obtain permission to develop.)
The riddle of tax incidence has long troubled economists, who
have developed sophisticated tools for analyzing the problem.
The initial economic approach would be to treat a subdivision
exaction as an excise tax on residential development. To intro-
duce students to this analytic approach, an instructor can draw
hypothetical pre-tax supply and demand curves for housing within
the taxing jurisdiction. To show the impact of the tax, one then
shifts the supply curve upward by a distance equal to the amount
of the tax. The intersection of the pre-tax demand curve and
the post-tax supply curve is the post-tax equilibrium. This sort of
exercise is standard in introductory economics courses, and is
hardly the most sophisticated approach to the incidence issue.
Nevertheless, the exercise is useful to get across to students two
important points: that the incidence of development charges de-
pends on the elasticity (or slopes) of the supply and demand curves
for housing in the taxing jurisdiction, and that it is rare for those
elasticities to be such that these taxes would be entirely passed on
to house purchasers. My own hunch is that when only a few out
of many suburbs impose special charges, the demand for housing
would be relatively elastic in those suburbs, and consequently
these charges would be mostly passed backward to those who
owned undeveloped land when the charges were initially enacted.,
Use of a partial equilibrium analysis of this sort to teach tax
incidence poses several ethical issues. The supply and demand
elasticities for housing in specific communities are not well under-
stood; moreover, economists do not regard partial equilibrium
analysis as the ultimate tool for analyzing incidence issues. In
addition, a land-use-law instructor who wishes to teach this mate-
rial faces a practical dilemma. If he desires to get across the idea
that taxes are not automatically passed on, should he draw graphs
that may paralyze a large fraction of his students, or should he
instead content himself with an oral, intuitive explanation? My
own practive at the three law schools where I have taught has been
to draw the graphs and to explain them the way I envision teachers
5. See Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 3, at 392-401, 425-30.
[Vol. 1: 1
HeinOnline  -- 1 UCLA J. Envtl. L & Pol'y 4 1980-1981
ROLE OF ECONOMICS
of economics would explain them to students in an introductory
economics course. I have found that student anxiety over the
presentation of such graphs seems to have declined as the years
have passed. A few students may, of course, come up after class
to ask for references to basic economics texts, but this is probably
a beneficial fallout from the exercise. Other students may also
not comprehend all of what has been presented. This should not
be of great concern because the basic point of the exercise is not
to teach law students how to draw such graphs but rather to con-
vey to them that there is a social science that one can turn to for
systematic discussion of the problem of tax incidence. Professor
A. Dan Tarlock and I therefore intend to include an illustrative
tax-incidence graph in the fiscal-issues chapter of our forthcoming
land-use controls casebook.6
The Colonial Oaks opinion poses a second question: Was the
New Jersey Supreme Court correct in holding that developers
should (at least sometimes) share their refunds with homebuyers?
Modern legal-economic theory, building on the work of Coase
and Calabresi,I suggests that the New Jersey Supreme Court's rule
is mistaken. If homebuyers are entitled to share in developer re-
funds, and know that they are so entitled, the added benefits that
the court has tried to bestow on them will be taken away from
them by market forces. Developers will now be selling not just
houses, but houses plus claims for refunds. Home prices will rise
by an amount equal to the value of the claim for a refund, and
homebuyers will have gained nothing.9
The underlying question is how parties in a chain of production
6. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CoNTROLs (Little, Brown forth-
coming 1981).
7. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
8. See esp. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
9. An example will help demonstrate this point. Suppose a municipality ille-
gally taxed a developer by SX per house, and that the developer was entitled
to recover and keep SX per house in refunds. The illegal tax would then not
affect house prices because a developer would not perceive his production costs
to be affected by the tax.
Suppose, by contrast, the developer's purchasers were each entitled
to recover the entire $X from the taxing municipality, but the developer, nothing.
The supply curve would then shift upward (to the left) by SX to account for
the developer's added costs of production, i.e., the tax he had to pay. The
demand curve would also shift upward (to the right) by SX because consumers
would take into account their entitlements to SX in refunds for each house
purchased. Regardless of the price elasticities of supply and demand, when
both curves shift upward by $X, the market price will rise by SX.
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(i.e., landseller, developer, homebuyers) ultimately share in gov-
ernment benefits bestowed on someone in the chain. The incidence
of these benefits does not turn on who is legally entitled to them,
just as the incidence of sales taxes does not depend on whether
buyers or sellers of goods have to pay such taxes. Rather, the
incidence of government benefits to an industry turns on the
underlying elasticities of supply and demand for that industry's
goods. (This incidence can be analyzed with the same sort of tools
economists use to analyze the incidence of taxes.) In short, the
New Jersey Supreme Court may help housing consumers by order-
ing refunds to the housing-production chain, but it does not much
matter to consumers which member of the chain has the entitle-
ment to refunds.
It might thus appear that the Colonial Oaks rule is not mistaken,
but merely irrelevant. However, as I have argued elsewhere,II all
parties in a chain of transfers are better off if the right to a refund
from a party outside the chain is vested in the "cheapest right
enforcer" within the chain. In the case of subdivision exactions,
developers are clearly the cheapest right enforcers. First, develop-
ers have more information than either homebuyers or landsellers
about what the local government has illegally exacted. Second,
homebuyers are too numerous to be able to organize cheaply to
pursue claims for refunds; landsellers will also be hard to organize
whenever a developer has assembled a tract through several purch-
ases. Third, because incidence of excessive development charges
is costly to unravel in any specific case, any rule that invites the
sharing of refunds in essence establishes a jobs program for econ-
ometricians at the expense of the parties to the controversy.
II.
CONTROVERSIAL ECONOMICS: THE PHENOMENON OF
GOVERNMENT SALES OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
To illustrate more controversial applications of economic anal-
ysis to land-use problems, I will invoke (somewhat presumptu-
ously) my own prior efforts to develop a positive and normative
theory of municipal treatment of owners of undeveloped land.,2
10. See Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 3, at 479-80.
11. For a similar analysis of the analagous problem of who should be entitled
to sue for antitrust damages, see Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers
Have Standing To Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of
the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 602 (1979).
12. See Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 3, passim.
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Briefly, that prior discussion assumed that all political actors are
self-interested, and that the resident homeowners in a small mid-
dle-income suburb would dominate the suburb's politics. The
analysis then predicted that these homeowners, if unconstrained
by law, would choose to adopt policies which would maximize
the value of their current real estate holdings, i.e., their houses.
In situations where they would be unable to raise housing prices
by restricting new development, they would try to capture for
themselves the value of development rights in the community.
One way to do this would be to place owners of undeveloped land
in a straitjacket, and then to agree to free the owners at a price.
More concretely, the positive side of the analysis predicted that
typical suburbs would place undeveloped land in "holding zones"
(for example, agriculture or noncumulative industrial districts),
and then release those lands for residential development through
rezonings (for PUD's or whatever), with the rezonings conditioned
on developer donations of land, land improvements, and money.
The developer contributions would enrich homeowners already
in residence by improving their relative fiscal positions; these fiscal
benefits would be capitalized into higher house prices. A home-
owner cartel which carried out such a program to perfection would
be able to garner all the producer's surplus that the developer
would otherwise have. I
Impressionistic data lend credibility to this theory of suburban
behavior. Mount Laurel Township, New Jersey, the site of one
of the most famous land-use decisions, seems to have been a classic
example of such suburbanite profit-maximizing. Mount Laurel
placed most of its undeveloped land in holding zones and then sold
development rights (via PUD approvals) in return for substantial
(and often illegal) developer contributions."
My positive theory of suburban behavior is controversial in
several respects. It is based on many simplifying assumptions, has
never been systematically verified, and, in part for these reasons,
is not a perspective on the dynamics of zoning that many other
land-use specialists presently share. Despite these shortcomings,
I believe that an unverified theory of this sort has an important
place in teaching-if no more than to serve as a focus (and foil)
for class discussion.' 5
13. Id. at 425-30.
14. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A. 2d 713 (1975).
15. The renowned Tiebout Hypothesis that households shop among competing
suburbs was also based on many simplifying assumptions, and remains contro-
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Commentators on land-use controls have been notably deficient
in devising testable hypotheses about how local governments are
likely to use the land-use control powers that higher governments
bestow on them. Many current writers adopt the optimistic, even
utopian, stance of -the early advocates of public control of private
land development. They view unplanned private development as
the harbinger of "housing crises" and "suburban sprawl," and see
massive public intervention as the only sure route to the "orderly,
balanced development" that is our salvation. My own particular
positive theories may not stand the test of time; I am confident,
however, that the traditional utopian view of the consequences
of public planning is likely to prove to be less tenable than my
own. In any event, the point is that a sound understanding of
public land-use control devices awaits the formulation and testing
of theories of local government behavior. The classroom is a tra-
ditional greenhouse for nurturing such theories-even unverified
ones.
I have invoked my prior writing on suburban growth controls
for a second reason. In discussing whether local governments
should be entitled to capture and then sell back development rights
in undeveloped land, I used what I now regard to be a potentially
inadequate system of normative analysis. Instead of scouring the
legal landscape for evidence of values thought to be relevant in
this setting, I instead revved up the rather meager normative
engines of economics-a discipline that consciously ducks most
normative questions. Modern welfare economics provides three
criteria for deciding such questions as whether the value of devel-
opment rights in land should be vested in landowners or in the
political faction that controls the local government where the land
is situated. The three criteria are (1) efficiency, (2) horizontal
equity (the like treatment of like-situated individuals), and (3) ver-
tical equity (the just distribution of wealth between rich and poor).
Applying these criteria, I concluded that allowing suburbanites
to enhance their welfare by capturing development rights would
not enhance efficiency, would not necessarily enhance vertical
equity, and would severely threaten horizontal equity among land-
owners. I therefore concluded that the legal system should require
a suburb either (1) to allow landowners to undertake residential
versial. Nevertheless, it has been one of the most important heuristic devices in
urban economics. See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POLITICAL ECON. 416 (1956).
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development of a type normal for that suburb, or (2) in cases
where the suburb did not allow normal development, to compen-
sate those landowners damaged by its more restrictive policies. '
I do not wish, in this space, to defend my application of the
three normative criteria that modern economics provides. Rather,
I would like to report my regret for giving inadequate considera-
tion to whether the three criteria are rich enough to identify all
the concerns that the legal system should take into account. Recent
scholarly writings advance the proposition that there may be im-
portant normative considerations that economics ignores.
III.
RECENT CRITICISM OF THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
ON LEGAL PROBLEMS
Criticism of economics is hardly new. Even beginning students
quickly point out that the Pareto superiority criterion for effi-
ciency is impractical in virtually all interesting situations, that
many tangential economic consequences (externalities) are ex-
tremely difficult to quantify, and that consumers often do not
behave as rationally as economists would suggest. These sorts of
criticisms, however, are basically within the family and do not cut
to the core of the endeavor.
Lately, some of the most esteemed legal scholars have mounted
a more fundamental and potentially devastating attack on eco-
nomic analysis of law. The earliest and wittiest of these skeptics
was Professor Arthur Leff,' 7 whose basic themes have been elab-
orated most notably by Professor Frank Michelman." s Both Leff
and Michelman are occasional, but highly skilled, practitioners
of economic analysis of law, and are hardly vulnerable to the
criticism that they are vandals who have set out to destroy a
culture they do not understand.
The essence of the new criticism is that the world is messy.
Those who try to make sense of it must inevitably oversimplify
16. See Suburban Growth Controls, supra note 3, at 418-24, 438-40.
17. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); see also Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
18. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law,
62 MNqN. L. REV. 1015 (1978); Michelman, Political Markets and Community
Self-Determination: Competing Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53
IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Political Markets].
See also Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; G. Schwartz,
Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice, 1979 Ws. L. REv. 799.
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the phenomena they see, and may do so in dangerous ways. Econ-
omists, many of whom are instinctively attracted by mathematical
models and graphic presentations, may psychologically be particu-
larly prone to oversimplification. (Freud had a somewhat scato-
logical word for this kind of personality.) Economics, these critics
would charge, errs when it identifies only efficiency, horizontal
equity, and vertical equity as the relevant considerations for policy-
makers. "Justice" also comprehends other concerns which may
be harder to articulate, and which ultimately may not be trans-
latable into economic language. Beware, say the critics; poets and
philosophers may know something that you do not.
Two desiderata not translatable into economic language have
won the respect of enough intelligent people to be worthy of spe-
cial mention. (I should confess at the outset that I usually find
both incomprehensible.) First, adherents of "rights-based" con-
ceptions of law regard the proper method for defining rights to
be philosophical speculation on the place of individuals in society,
not some utilitarian calculus that assigns rights in order to achieve
broader social goals. ,9
A second non-economic normative perspective - one perhaps
more relevant to land-use specialists - is the notion that a group
of persons can have objective values and interests that are not
necessarily discernible through an aggregation of the individual
values and interests of the group's members. Among legal writers,
Professor Michelman has made the boldest attempt to flesh out
this basic challenge to the fundamental economic conception that
the only relevant players are individuals seeking atomistically to
maximize their welfares.2 ° In effect, Michelman argues that there
may be reasons for permitting "community self-determination"
which are not picked up by the normative apparatus that econo-
mists conventionally use. An individual's self-fulfillment may turn
in large measure on the achievements of groups to which he or she
belongs. Moreover, a person's tastes are not entirely self-engen-
dered, but arise to a great degree from peer influence and from
perceptions of the collectivity's norms. This collectivist view is of
course unsettling to persons steeped in the libertarian and indi-
vidualistic notions which underlie Western institutions. There are
good reasons for this; the lure of group fulfillment has taken many
19. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Borgo, Causal
Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STruD. 419 (1979); Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
20. See Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 18, at 149-52.
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societies down the road to serfdom. Nevertheless, one must admit
the possibility that there is something to it; it unquestionably has
appealed to many persons in many places at many times. In fact,
most local officials who implement public land-use controls would
explain, if asked, that "community self-determination" was pre-
cisely what they were up to.
Michelman admits that community self-determination is a fuzzy
notion, but warns that it may be dangerous to ignore what one has
a hard time grasping. This is a warning that the best lawyer-econo-
mists have always heeded. Professor Guido Calabresi admitted in
his famous article (coauthored with Melamed) that the lens of
economics provided only "One View of the Cathedral." 2' Leff
and Michelman themselves might concede that economics is, in
fact, the best lens now available. But there are, they say, other
lenses and other vantage points.
As this conference is being held in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
where Hegelian analysis seems to be making a bit of a comeback,"
it is fitting to close with an Hegelian metaphor. All the law pro-
fessors who have made presentations at this conference are mem-
bers of a generation that entered the teaching profession during
the period 1965-1971. This was a period when the work of Coase
and Calabresi was opening up new opportunities to legal acade-
micians cocky enough to try their hand at economics. Members of
our generation seized that opportunity. Some may have done so
to excess. Against this thesis of law and economics there has re-
cently sprung up an Hegelian antithesis: law and philosophy.
Many of the young talents in law teaching now have as their gods,
not Coase and Calabresi, but Ackerman, Dworkin, Michelman,
and Rawls. The conference discussion has made it clear that
around Harvard these days one can score more points criticizing
law and economics than practicing it. In fact, in spots, the con-
ference discussion has revealed that the critics can be as guilty of
excessive zeal as the most militant lawyer-economists. Hegel would
forecast a future synthesis, no doubt from a later generation of
scholars whose work will utterly baffle us.
21. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
22. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Haav. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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